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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY PAULEY, 
Plaintiff, Appellant I vs. 
CAROL ZAR.BOCK, 
Detendant, Respondent 
I Case No. 192638 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, IN AND POR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE 
ELDON A. ELIASON 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Delta, Utah 84624 
STATEMENT OF THE NAT1_TRE OF THE CASE 
This case is a personal injury action in which the 
Defendant admits mis-judgment in her perception which 
caused her to run into the rear of the plainiff's stopped 
vehicle while plaintiff was waiting her turn to drive up 
to the window of the Valley Bank and Tru"t Company, 
Cottonwood Branch, on Highland Drive, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The Court found the Defendant negligent m; 
a matter of law. There was no claim of contributory 
negligence, nor intervening third party. Counsel for the 
Plaintiff and Defendant stipulated on the amount of doc-
tor hills of two medical doctors and of a physical thera-
pist and stipulated to the amount of lost wages, and stipu-
lated to the receiving of hospital report-; in evidence. 
The stipulation did not go to the matter of liability. 
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l111i 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict of No Cause of Action 
upon which the Honorable Judge Frank Wilkins ren-
dered judgment and subsequently denied plaintiff's mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding verdict or in the alter-
native, a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order remanding the cause back 
to the trial court with instructions to award damages 
to the Appellant, or for an order granting a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts is made brief because the 
Defendant was found guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law in running into the rear end of Plaintiff's stopped 
vehicle at the drive-in window at the Vallrey Bank and 
Trust Company and no contributory negligence was 
claimed by the defendant on the part of the plaintiff and 
there was no claim of third party involvement, and ap-
parently the only matter for determination is defendant·~~ 
liability as determined by proximate cause which the 
plaintiff contends should have been determined as a mat-
ter of law by the Court and covered in the instructions 
to the jury,from which the jury could have offered spe-
cial and general damages. 
For the purpose of showing causal connection be-
tween the a~ident, the injury and the damages, the fact;; 
were that the plaintiff was sitting in her car turned side-
ways looking in her purse for a pen to fi]] out a depo:0 it 
slip. Her car W3S stopped, out of g-ear and her frot on 
the brake pedal. TR-10. Plaintiff testifie<l that juE't 
when the woman in front pulled away from fo9 window, 
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she, pbintiff, got a tenific joit by impact from the car 
behind, hard enough to throw forward two small child-
ren who were strapped under one seat belt in the adjoin-
ing seat. The Plaintiff and the Defendant, driver of the 
other car, had some Lrief conve1sation immediately. That 
rubber bumper guards on back of Plaintiff's car had pre-
vented any scratching or bending. TR 12-3. Plaintiff did 
tell the defendant, however, that she was concerned about 
having a phy::lical problem, because of an injury to her 
ne::k she had su'=>tained the year before in a fall; that 
she was afraid of injury because of the collision. TR 
12-9. Plaintiff made a depo' it at the bank and started 
home and began to have p?in in her neck and on reach-
ing up on the right side of her neck discovered a swelling 
or lump about the size of an egg \:.,•hich had developed 
since the impact with defendant. The pain and the swel-
ling or lump on the side of her neck developed from tl-ie 
time she left the bank window at Highl;-nd Drive to 23rcl 
East Street, a clistance of approximately 6 blocks, with 
no intervening orcurence of any kincl. TR 12-24. 
She was distressed and immediately called her doc-
tor, Dr. Clifford Cutler, who had been her family doctor 
for many years and who had her come immediately to 
his office. TR 13. The accident was about 2 :30 P.M.; the 
rail was at 3 o'cl0ck P.M. and the appointment was given 
for 3 :30 P.M. TR 15. He examined her, gave her mecli-
cal treatment and medication for relief of pain and the 
lump on her nerk, placed her in a surgical collar and 
macl.e an immediate appointment for her to see a physi-
cal therapist, one David Shields, at the Cottonwcod Hrs-
pital. TR 14-15, The patient rnw Dr. Cutler frequently 
afterwards. TR 15, and went to see the therapist almoot 
daily. Five day8 later, on the 11th or 12th of December, 
Dr. Cut1er put the patient in the Cottonwood Hospi-
tal for intensive therapy treatment where she was placed 
in traction with 6 lb. wei~ht constantly on her neck and 
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diathermy treatment with moist packs and massage being 
applied by the therapist. TR 15-8 •· Mrs. Pauley, in an-
swer to question about any limitation or of pain pri-
or to the collision, answered as follows: "I never, be-
fore the accident at the Bank, had any limitatiom at all 
with my arm or my shoulder. I had no pains in that 
area at all until then. To this day, I have pain in my 
arm and shoulder. It starts both down the back of my 
neck, over my shoulder, down my arm here." TR 15-20. 
Plaintiff did, however, te:;;tify to having sustained a fall 
in December of 1966, in a parking lot, for which injury 
she had treatments and therapy beginning January of 
1967, through June, but had completely recovered by July 
of 1967 and was doing all former activities including 
bowling, fishing, hunting, water skiing, housework, with 
no limitations, none of which she has been able to do 
since the accident with Carol Zarbock on December 5, 
1967. TR 17. 
The Plaintiff's husband, John Pauley, te:.;tified to 
having been married to the Plaintiff for approximately 
20 years; that they have an eleven year old son at home, 
and when he, the husband, returned from work on the 5th 
of December, 1967, his wife was at the Cottonwood Hos-
pital having treatments to her neck. That evening he ob-
served the swelling on her neck or a knot about the size 
of an egg. TR 101. That she was in cons,iderable pain 
and that evening took pain pills and muscle relaxant un-
der the doctor's orders. That on the day before the 5th 
and prior thereto, she had been very normal, with no 
pain, no discomforts, had engaged in sports, including 
golfing and bo\vl\ng, fishing. He knew of no limitations 
physically or any discomfort that his wife experienced 
prior to Dec. 5, 1967. TR 103-104. 
R. Don Vernon, a physical therapist at Cottonwood 
Hospital, testifier! t~at the Plaintiff, Mrs. Pauley, was 
treated at the Cottonwood Hospital by the ch:ef 
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therapist, David Shields, on Dec. Gth and nearly every 
uther day for 3 weeks. That she was placed on self-ad-
ministered treatment at the home in April until she wav 
reierred back for treatment by Dr. La Verne Erickson, 
Neuro spec,ali.:it, Sept. 11, 1968. 
Dr. LaVerne Erickson, Neuro specialist and Neuro 
surgeon of Salt Lake City, testified that the patient wa.., 
referred to him and that he first saw her on March 22, 
1968, at which time she complained of injury to her neck 
which she called \vhip la::1h' and related it to an accident 
of the 5th of December, 1967 while she was waiting to 
go to the drive-in bank window and her veh~cle was hit 
in the rear,TR 56. The Doctor testified that when he saw 
her, her main symptom; were pain of the left side of 
neck and of the shoulder going into the area a little be-
low her shoulder blade and into much of the left upper 
extremity at the wrist are1, and this would occur e3pec-
ially with the use or activity of the arm. That she had 
some numbness, discomfort into the third, fourth and 
fifth fingers, her digits on the left hand were numb. She 
had head ache which was described as on both sides of 
the back of the neck and in the head itself, which would 
progress to become a generalized headache if it continued. 
TR 56. The doctor further testified that he conducted a 
neurological examination and examination of the limbs, 
joints and musulature structure for the sensation, the 
feelings and the strength and the evaluation of the joints 
that were involved and of the other joints, too, and 
found that she had some - - I think the pos'.tive findings 
really were some mild differences in the reflexes being 
less active in this left upper extremity, what I label a' 
tricep.:; jerk, whi•:h is striking the triceps mu~cle here, 
causing motion, which compared to the other right side 
was le s active. TR 58-2. Doctor Erickson further tes-
tifkd that the pat'ent, Mr;:;. Pauley, had on the first 
\'isit, tenderness in the neck, pain of movement in the 
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neck. She had some muscle tightness which in part is the 
subjective type of evaluation, and partly watching a per-
son when they are moving about in your office has ;,,ome 
degree of objectivity, or being apart from a person's abil-
ity to control it. She had tendernern over the neck mus-
cles and some tightness, mainly tenderness on the left 
side of the neck at the base of the skull, and on examina-
tion of the feeling, some lessened sen;,ation on that first 
visit a.long the fifth digit here and along this heeled part 
of the hand and also along this thumb side there was some 
slight difference in sensation, less active sensation to pin-
prick response and vibratory sensation, which is a tong 
fork applied to that portion, which was somewhat less 
active, as well. So those were the main things I think, on 
examination at that time. TR 60-16. 
In answer to quesition by Plaintiff's counsel, he said: 
Question. What treatment, if any, did you prescribe, 
doctor? 
Ans. I suggested at that time that she be hospital-
ized and checked for the possibility of a disc in the neck 
at this level because of the reflex difference. That led to 
her first hospitalization, then, in April of 1968 she was 
in for five days then and had a myelogram at the LDS 
Hospital under my care, and that myelogram showed 
some minor differences, really, which getting into them, I 
think, it would just confuse the issue. TR 60-20. 
The doctor was further asked on direct examination, 
Question: "What did you find the condition of Mrs. 
Pauley to be, Doctor? What were her ailments? 
Ans. We thought she had some irritation of the 
nerve, but her primary problem was one to be treated 
conservatively with a cervical sprain as the diagnosis. 
TR 62-1. 
Question: How long have you continued to treat the 
patient, Doctor, 8nd no you have a record of the dates in 
which you have rendered treatment'! 
6 
Ans. : Yes. We have seen her off and on since that 
time, about the tin.t of the year after that first visit 
about every two to three months, generally more infre-
quently. 
Question: Now, going back to your primary, your 
first examination that you made of her when you diag-
no.,ed her ~onditicn a:; a cervical sprain, I am going to 
ask you, Doctor, if, based upon your clinical examination 
ancl based upon your subjective and your objective find-
ings, if you have an opinion ba.:,ed upon reasonable medi-
cal certainty as to the cause of this condition? 
Ans.: Yes. 
Que tion: And what is that cpinion, Doctor? 
Ans.: I believe that it was caused by the injury that 
:.he reported on that first visit. 
Que.;tion: It was associated, then, with trauma? 
Ans.: Yes, trauma, in 1967. TR 63-17. 
Question by Counsel: The symptoms, I under. tand, 
developed on the 5th day of December, 1968, and I am 
wondering if it is significant that it developed on a day 
certain, rather than over a gradual period of time? 
Ans.: Yes, I believe the injury was the source of 
that. 
Question: And what significence is there to that, 
Doctor? 
Ans.: I think she had enough of an injury then to 
ca1;se a S"prain in the neck. 
A most unfortunate circumstance relating to the 
facts and issues of this case is that while Mrs. Pauley, 
the Plaintiff, was receiving medical treatment from Dr. 
LaVerne Erickson and physical therapy treatment.;; from 
Don Vernon, that in July of 1969, while she was at the 
Ccttonwood Mall parking lot, her vehicle was again run 
into from the rear by one Grace Harrington, after which 
:
1ccident her injuries and f"uffering were added to and/or 
ag-g-ravated with this occurrence. The trial of the issues 
was clouded by an Insurance Ad.itFter for Nationwide In-
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surance Co., one John H. Ware, who was called to testify 
by defendant. There was a deliberate attempt on the part 
of the two insurance companies, the one represented by 
defendant's counsel and the one representing Nationwide 
Insurance Co., to discredit the plaintiff and they charac-
terized their dialogue as attempting to impeach the credi-
bility of the witness, Mrs. Pauley. When plaintiff's coun-
sel registered his objection to the line of questioning as 
being entirely irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial. TR 
155-10. Over objections of Plaintiff's counsel, the witness 
representing Nationwide Insurance Co. attempted to re-
cite conver.sation of June 19, 1971, with Plaintiff and her 
counsel relative to negotiations for settlement of the Har-
rington accident of July, 1969. The witness stated that 
Mrs. Pauley had said to him that she had been released 
by her physician as it relates to injuries received prior to 
the accident of July of 1969. She said that she had phy.s-
ical problems directly related to an accident occurring in 
July of 1969 for which she was making claim against 
Nationwide. TR 157-5. This testimony was given despite 
the fact that Plaintiff had never indicated to him the na-
ture of the injuries or the duration of the treatment 
that were attributable to either of the accidents, 
but that she and her counsel had promised to furnish him 
a report of evalua,tion by the doctor determining which 
injuries were due to which accident which fact he knew 
to be the case. TR 159-12. At three different times the 
witness was asked by defense counsel if there was more to 
the conversation, TR 157-11. He had said, "the witness 
had indicated to me" TR 156-27, showing that he was 
making the dialogue to suit himself. Again he was asked 
by counsel, "was there more to the conversation in rela-
tion to those expenses?" Ans.: "There was quite a bit of 
substance to the entire conversaition and I'm rnrry, but I 
can't remember ex8ct worrls or all of the conversat'on at 
this late date without anything to refer to." Again 
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the question by counsel. Ques.: "Do you have any recol-
lection now as to any amounts that were referred to in 
relation to medical expenses as that related to the accident 
of July 1969?" (Which questiom were irrelevant and 
prejudicial.) That to the leading question, he was per-
mitted to speculate that, "Attorney Eliason told me that 
there were expen:es relating to the injury of approxim-
ately $1200, and I never seen a lis1t or itemization of 
these". TR 158-3. He was again asked by defense coun-
: el, Ques.: "Was there anything e~se to the conversation 
other than what ycu have related?" He answered "NO". 
TK 158-7. 
The Plaintiff was by this dialogue characterized as 
a money hungry, claim seeker, in the eyes of the jury, 
without any opportunity for Plaintiff's counsel to discuss 
the relative details of or the procedures for filing claims 
with Insurance carriers for fear tha 1t the same would be, 
if even mentioneci, grounds for a mistrial. 
STATEMENT AND STIPULATION OF 
MEDICAL FACTS AND EXPENSE 
Counsel for the Defendant stipulated with Counsel 
for the Plaintiff and reported to the Court and Jury the 
following: 
Mr. Christian: I'll be happy to stipulate. If the pro-
per person were called to testify they would testify that 
the charges I shall indicate were chargei made for ser-
vices performed for and on behalf of Mrs. Pauley and 
that the charges so made were so reasonable. I do not 
stipulate, however, that the services performed were nec-
essary nor do I stipulate that we are respons1ible there-
for. Those charges are as follows, your Honor: See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. "l". Dr. Clifford N. Cutler, State-
ment for Services, including: 
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Dec. 5, 1967 Office call and Examination 
Dec. 5, 1967 X-Ray, Cervical Spine & 
Cervical Collar 
$ 5.00 
25.00 
Dec. 12, 1967 Office Call 4.00 
Dec. 14, 1967 Hosp. Admittance & 
Initial Hosp. call 25.00 
Dec. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 Hospital calls 30.00 
Jan. 1, 15 Office calls 8.00 
$97.00 
For a t<Ytal services to Dr. C. N. Cutler, as per Exhi-
bit P "l" and stipulation, the sum of $97.00 
Physical Therapy treatments as per Ex. P "l", stipu-
lated to were administered Dec. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 22, 23, 26, 27 & 30. 
Jan. 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 24 & 27. 
Charges at Cottonwood Hospital for admittance Dec. 
13, 1967 were $318.95, as per stipulation and Exhibit. 
Charges for admittance to L.D.S. Hospital, April 10, 
1968, as per treatment by Dr. Erickson were $317.90. 
Loss of earnings stipulated to was 111h days, for 
$180.00. 
All of which claims shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit "1" 
were direct and proximate results of the injuries re-
ceived by the Plaintiff on December 5, 1967. 
Statement of W. R. Spence, M.D. -- that was an elec-
tro myelogram, wasn't it, Mr. Eliason? Mr. Eliason: Yes, 
Mr. Chri«itian, $40.00. And physic<i l therapy, $536.00; 
and medication, of what bills I have seen of $58.00. As 
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medical evidence there was admitted into evidence Exhi-
bit p "l". Upon stipulation of counsel of both plaintiff 
and defendant that Dr. C. N. Cutler rendered s.ervices 
to Mary Pauley on Dec. 5, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18. 19 and 20 in 
1967 and on January 8 and 15 of 1968, and it was stipu-
lated that Dr. Cutler would testify if called that the value 
of the services so rendered was reasonable. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The tr:aJ Court erred in refusing to find as a mat-
ter of law that the proximate cause of the injuries and 
damages to the Plaintiff was the negligent acb of the 
defendant. 
II. That the Court erred in not directing a verdict 
on the liability of the def end ant as requested in Plaintiff's 
In~itruction No. 1. 
III. That the trial Court erred in allowing the testi-
mony of witnesi' John M. Ware, Nationwide Insurance 
Company, over objections of plaintiff's counsel, which 
te"timony was irrelevant, inadmissable and prejudicial. 
IV. That the verdict is not supported by the evi-
dence and was and is against all of the substantial evi-
dence and testimnny. 
V. That thP Court abused its discretion in refusing 
to g-rant a new trial or judgment notwithstanding ver-
rlict in liQ·ht of the overwhelming· evidence of the defend-
;i~t's liahilit:v ancl of the plaintiff's injury and damage. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Court erred in not finding as 
a matter of law that the defendant's negligence 
was the proximate cause of injury, making defendant lia-
ble. When the Court found that the defendant was neg-
ligent in causing the accident complained of with the 
Plaintiff on Dec. 5, 1967, and when there was no finding 
or even any claim of contributory negligence by the de-
fendant and when there was no claim of any third party 
involvement and especially where the evidence is uncon-
tradicted and even stipulated with defendant, that plain-
tiff on the day of the accident and following, incurred 
medical expenses with Dr. Clifford N. Cutler for examin-
ation and treatment of her injuries, which continued 
with Dr. Cutler for several days, including hospital ad-
mittance and treatment under his direction, totaling 
$97.00, and when the evidence is uncontradicted, undis-
puted and even stipulated that Plaintiff incurred expens-
es for physical therapy treatment from physical therapist 
David Shields and Don Vernon, beginning Dec. 5, 1967, 
the day of the accident and injury and continuing there-
after almost daily for several weeks, and when the evi-
dence is further conclusive, uncontradicted, undisputed 
and in fact, stipulated to, that plaintiff had ll 1h daf.y's of 
loss of earnings because of hospitalization and inability 
to work following the accident, there can be no question 
of the causal connection and the liability of the defendant. 
Liable has bP-en defined by the Court as follows: 
"Liable is the state of being liable or oblioated in law 
of justice. It is that which is under obligation to 
pay, or for which one is liable." Bouev v. Central 
Mutual Insurance C0. of Chicago, 196 SE 887. 
In Words :=n•rl PhrasP~. Perm~npnt Erl. Vol. ?5, n()' 
71, in a quobt;on from Ravwoorl v. Shreve N .. J.L. (15 
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vrom) 94, 104, the following statement of the law is 
made as to liability for one's Acts: 
"Liability as a legal term signifies that condi-
tion of affairs which gives rise to an obligation to 
do a particular thing to be enforced by action, as we 
say, an Executor is liable for the debts of his Testa-
tor, or, a principal is liable for the acts of his agent." 
By exactly the same reasoning a tort feasor is liable 
for the con.::,equences of his tortuous act. 
Liability hai' always been held to apply to responsi-
bility for torts aR well a; for breacl1 of contract and is 
used in Utah's statute of Limitation of Actions. 78-12-26, 
applicable to actions on liability net bound upon instru-
ment in writing but which liability includes respon.::,ibil-
ity for torts and is applied to all actions of law, not spe-
cifically mentioned in other portions of the titatutes. 
Liability is al"o described in relation to an automo-
bile liability polky under the terms of which the insurer 
agrees to pay on behalf of the insured $5000.00 for injur· 
ies to one person and $10,000.00 to two or more in any 
one accident, which the insured should after date of issu-
ance of the policy, become obligated to pay by reason 
of liability imposed on him by law as a re:ult of the own-
ership or use of the automobile described in the policy 
and under contract the company becsme liab!e for the lia-
bility of the tort feasor upon the occurrence of the injury. 
Such a case was Hicken v. Allstate, 147 SW 2d 182. 
Liability attaches when there is proximate cau.se or 
legal cause or cause not remote to be speculative, con-
necting the wrongful act to the injuries and damage in-
volved. 
Proximate ~ause is de"lcribed in American Juris-
prudence 2d Vol. 58, Sec. 128, pg. 478. 
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"As the proximate, not the remote t'.au;:;e, the conllel' 
tion between the negligence and the rnj ury mu::it Le 
a direct and natural sequence of events unbroken. 
The law does not require that negligence of the de-
fendant must be the sole cause of the injury in order 
to entitle to damages. All that is required is 
that the negligence in quest1on. shall be a proximate 
cause of the injury." 
Under the lmv of pr0bable cause as recited m Am. 
Jur. 2d Ed. Vol. 57, Se:. 141, it is stated: 
"It is sufficient if the proof show.; that various 
possible causes shown by the evidence, the one for 
which the defendant was re3ponsible, was the most 
probable." Quoting further from Am Jr 2d, Vol. 57, 
Sec. 142, "The test for cause in fact is (1) in all 
cases where proximate cause is an issu~, the first 
step is to determine whether the defendant's conduct 
in point of fact was a factor in causing the plaintiff's 
damage." In other words, except where there are 
concurrent causes for the injuries sustained, an 
actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor 
in bringing about harm to another if the harm would 
have been sustained even if the actor had not been 
negligent. If the inquiry as to cause in fact shows 
that the defendant's conduct in point of fact wa-
not a factor in causing the plaintiff's damage, the 
matter ends there, but if it shows that his conduct 
was a factor in ca1rning such damage, then the fur· 
ther question is whether Ms conduct played si1ch a 
part in causing the domaqe as makes him the author 
of such damage and l:'able thrrefore in the eyes of the 
law. An inquiry into Cause in Fact requires an<wers 
to several questions in determining whether there was 
cause in fact. Courts generallv apply one or more 
of the varioirn tests and criteria. Semo c~s~.;; htiV" 
relied on the ordinary natural conse0uence test or on 
the substantial factor tP,')t cmflle.. orbit of the risk 
test, all of whicli in pffrct ~lc1 the clefenrl~nt ]ial)le 
for any an<l ~lll of the direct cn"'.'s2'")'Jences of ri,·s ru-
rluct." 
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The circumstances surrounding the negligence, the 
injury and the damages m the Pauley vs. Zarbock case, 
are so definite, so immediate, so continuous that there can 
be no doubt whatsoever that the conduct of the defendant 
was a factor (and the only factor) causing such injury 
and the resulting damage3, and according to the authori-
ties makes the defendant the author of such damages as 
a matter of law, and li&ble therefore in the eyes of the 
law. Damages are automatic where there is probable 
cause and liability. 
ln regard to the matter of damage3 resulting from 
liability, substantive and the case law provides that when-
ever there is an invasion of one'.:; rights, the law infers 
some damage and the innocent person therefore has a 
remedy, irrespective of the amount or the actuality of the 
damages. 22 Am J ur 2d page 15. It is the general rule 
that where a canse of action is established, the law im-
ports damages from the invasion of one's legal rights. 
22 Am J ur 2d. page 15. 
The matter of liability and of proximate cause either 
became a matter of law to be determined by the Court; or C1 
more complete and understandable instruction on proba-
ble cause and liability was required of the Court, as re-quested,~ it declined to instruct as requested on a dir-
ected v1>rrlict after having found negligence as a matter 
of Ji:r;.,;,,, ieaving the jury entirely up in the air with the 
Court's instruction No. 14, which was as follows: "I have 
determined as a matter of law that the defendant was 
negligent in making contact with the plaintiff's vehicle on 
Dec. 5, 1967. Therefore, the only issues for you to deter-
mine in this matter are: 
A. Whether the injuries and damages, of which 
Plaintiff complains were proximately caused by the De-
fendant's negligence and, if so, 
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B. What amount of money, if any, should be award-
ed to Plaintiff. The Plaintiff in order to prevail must 
prove both A and B above by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 
POINT II. The Court erred in not directing a 
verdict for Plaintiff as a matter of law. 
Without instructions the jury lacked understanding 
as to legal cause and proximate cause. Court's Instruc-
tions No. 13 and 14 were completely inadequate. The Utah 
cases have imposed upon the Court the duty and respon-
sibility of directing and determining liability as a matter 
of law when there is no substantial dispute in the evi-
dence. One such case is Roylance v. Davis, 18 Utah 2d. 
395, 424 Pac. 2d. 142, where the Court held: 
"When there is no substantial dispute in the evidence 
and when the trial Court can say as a matter of Iaw 
that reasonable men could find ~mly one way on the 
facts, then it is the trial Judge's duty to determine 
the applicable law and direct the jury to return a ver-
dict under the law and the facts presented." 
The Court held the jurors are more likely to try to 
do fireside justice than are Judges who have the duty to 
enforce the law as it is written. Under the law a direct-
ed verdict is required under circumstances of the Paul-
ey case. 
Corpus Juris Secundum 58. In discussing trial 
procedure on pags 420, is quoted as follows: 
"Where the evidence iq conclusive a fact issue 
can be decided only as a matter of law. Evidence 
may be so conclusive as to entitle the Plaintiff to 
a favorable findin.2' as a matter of law, but in the ab-
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sence of an aumfasion by the oppo::iite party the per-
son having the burden of proof seldom establishes 
his claim as a matter of law, and defendant on whom 
rests the burden of an affirmative defense may make 
out h;s case with a measure of certainty that entitles 
him to a ruling of the Court against the Plaintiff 
taking the ca::ie from the jury." Where all the evi-
dence, fairly cons,£dered, points to one conclusion 
only, a question of law is presented which is not for 
the jury." 
It is viclative cf the legal righh of t:1e Piaint'ff if 
the Court dCE:s n0t make rnch finding as a. matter of law, 
as is stated in O'Connor v. Boulder Cclorado Sanitar:um 
Association, 112 Pac. 2::l 633, in which case the plaintiff 
filed action to rercver dam ·1 gee; resulting from allegEd 
negligent care in treatment by agents of the Boulder, Col-
crado Sanitarium As.sociation. A motion was inter-
pcsed by counsel for the Sanitar'.um for a directed verdict 
concerning which the trhl Court reserved it<> ruling. Dur-
ing the time the jury was deliberating upon its verdict 
the Trial Judge read a part of the testimony which had 
been transcribed and had the Court Reporter read to him 
a part of the other testimony and when the verdicts here-
in were returned he advised the jury t1at there was ''O 
evidence to warrant a verdict against the Sanitarium. 
However, regardless of this statement, and independent 
thereof, we entertain the same opinion. It is true t'rnt 
Court<> should be very reluctant to take the issue olf prox-
imate cause from a jury, and this perhaps was the reason 
why the Trial Court in the instant case, not having in 
mind all the evidPnce, rnbmitted the fact to the jury. 
Where, however, the record is devoid of evidence showing 
a p"oba bilitv of proximate cause, the question becomes 
one of law for tlie Court. In our opinien, the situation 
h$re calh for the applic::ition of that rule. I/ 
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The most convincing and most recent case involving 
such requirements for a directed verdict and one which 
is almost identical in all fact situations as well as being 
directly in line with the legal pronouncements is the case 
of Lee F. Lechner v. Sarah Bruce Kelly, 467 SW 2d 652. 
In that case the Appellee te,,tified that she was stopped 
at a traffic signal, did not see the Appellant's automobile 
prior to tne collision. She further testified that as a re-
bult of the impact from behind her car came to rest at a 
point approximately 24 steps from the point of impact. 
She offered evidence showing that damage to her automo-
bile amounted to the sum of $149.00. One Alfred Brink-
ley, Jr., called as a witness by the Appellant, testified that 
he observed the accident from his place of employment at 
a service fOfation located across the street. He testified 
that immediately before the impact the Lechner automo-
bile came to a complete stop and then rolled forward into 
the appellant's automobile and bumped it. The Appellant 
argued that the testimony of Brinkley showing that appel-
lant stopped before colliding with appellee, together with 
his own testimony that he saw the appellee and made "at 
least some application of his brakes" was sufficient to 
create a disputed fact issue. In determining whether the 
foregoing evidence is sufficient to support a judgment non 
obstante verdicto, we are required to consider all of the 
evidence in the record in a light most favorable to the 
findings of the jury and disregard all evidence to the con-
trary. If there is any evidence of probative force to sup-
port the Jury's findings exonerating the appellant, the 
judgment non obstante verdicto cannot be sustained. That 
the Court held : 
"In rare cases, to which we think this one belongc;, 
where the evidence is without material dispute and 
where only one reasonable inference may be drawn 
therefrom, the question of negligence becomec; one 
of law. The rule simply means that if reasonable 
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minds can differ as to the inferences and conclusions 
to be drawn from the undisputed evidence then the 
case is one for the jury. If reasonable minds cannot 
differ, then an issue of law is presented. It cannot 
be gainsaid that one who fails to stop his automobile 
in response to a traffic signal, _but propels the same 
into the rear end of an automobile which has stopped 
in obedience to the signal, is guilty of negligence, 
PROXIMATELY CAUSING The INJURY Or DAM-
AGE UNLESS SUCH CONDUCT IS EX.CUSED 
BY SOME EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OR 
CONDITION. 
And in that case as in the pre ent Pauley v. Zarbock 
case, there L no c~ntention that there are any extenuat-
ing circumstances excusing the driver from colliding with 
the rear of the &topped vehicle. For a very similar ca~e 
involving the same rule requir · ng a directed verdict the 
Court cites Hoey v. Solt, 236 SW 2:1 244. Both cases are 
ll'idely annotated. It is rnbmitted that there is no differ-
ence whatsoever whether as to fact situation or law in-
rolved with these landmark cases and in the in:::tant case 
uf Pauley v. Zarbock. 
To reannalyze and parallel said facts, Plaintiff Paul-
ev was stopped waiting her turn to pull up to the drive-in 
window at the Valley Bank and Tru'.7t Co.. Defendant 
admits running i11to rear of plaintiff's vehicle because rf 
misjudgment. Defendant does not claim any negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff. Defendant does nrt 
claim any intervening act of a third party. Plaintiff te--
tified of immediate injuries, a swelling or lump on her 
neck within 10 minutes to one-half hour from the time of 
accident; of pain. discomfort and limitation of bodily func-
tions. She testified to having been free of such condi-
tions prior to the accident. She testified that Dr. Clifford 
N. Cutler examined her approximRtely one-half hour af-
ter <iccic!ent, put her in a .'-'urgical cnllar and referred her 
to a ph.v;;ical thPrapist, TR 14. Dr. Cutler treated her 
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for several days and directed her admittance to Cotton-
wood Hospital for specialized therapy for 5 days. TR 15. 
Therapists David Shields and Don Vernon both treated the 
Plaintiff for cervical sprain for several weeks following 
the accident. TR III. 
Plaintiff's husband, John Pauley, testified that plain-
tiff was free of disability, pain and had no injuries or 
swelling on the neck prior to the accident on the 5th of 
December, 1967. That on the evening of the 5th of Dec-
ember he observed the knot on her neck, that she was in 
pain, had limitations of motion and was taking pain pills 
and muscle relaxants. TR 101. 
Dr. LaVerne Erickson, Neuro specialist, testified that 
he treaited her beginning March 22, 1968 for cervical 
sprain resulting from a whiplash of Dec. 5, 1967, TR 56. 
That she had tenderness in her neck, pain of movement in 
the neck, muscle tightness, and had head aches, and he re-
quested further hospitalization for possible disc injury, 
TR 60. After treating the patient for more than one year, 
the Doctor gave it as his opinion that the injury of the 
Plaintiff was caused by the accident she reported of Dec-
ember 5, 1967. TR 63. Being specific, he answered: 
Question: Do you have an opinion based on reas-
onably medical certainty as to the cause of her ailment? 
Ans.: "Yes, 1 believe the injury was the source of 
that. I think she had enough of an injury then to cause 
a sprain in the neck." This testimony is not only the 
greater weight of the believable testimony but the only 
testimony respecting such matters and the fact that 
she was injured remains uncontradicted, especially where 
the Defendant has stipulated as to reasonableness of medi-
cal and hospital bills and as to the reasonableness of loss 
of earnings while the Plaintiff was thus being treated, 
even though he didn't admit being the cause of all of them. 
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POINT Ill. The Court erreJ in allowing the wit-
ness, John SvI. Ware, Claim;:; Adjuster for Nationwide In-
surance Company, to testify relative to negotiations on a 
sulJsequent accident. 
While the Plaintiff wa3 recovering under Doctor's 
treatment from the injuries of her accident with Defend-
ant, on December 5, 1967, she was a victim of a second 
rear end accident. which happened in July of 1969, which 
aLlded to or aggravated the prev :ous accident's resulting 
injurie~. Dr. LaVerne Erick.:on, Neuro specialist, contin-
ued his treatment of the plaintiff through the fir"t injury 
and with the physical therapists, continued with their pat-
ient following the second accident. The Pl1intiff and her 
attorney had been negotiating with Defendant's In. urance 
Company prior to the 0econd accident and were, of course, 
immediately contflcted by insurance carrier for the driver 
in the second 2cciuent. The Dcctor knew of the condition 
of the Plaintiff hefore the second accident, knew of her 
symptom'3, diagnC1sis and treatment of the second accident 
and should have been the one to testify, and was called by 
Plaintiff to describe the effects of the second accident, 
but the i~sues were clouded when counsel for the Defend-
Pnt called the Insurance Adjuster to testify relative to 
the settlement negotiations on the second accident. Plain-
tiff's counsel objected to the entire line of questioning; 
stating that it was entirely irrelevant, immaterial and for-
eign to the issues of the case and even prejudicial. TR 155. 
After the objections, the Court called both counsel to 
the table for discussion and overruled Plaintiff's objection. 
The witness after four leading questions, to which he gave 
uncertain answers, was permitted to testify to the follow-
ing que:;.tion: Question: Do you have any recollection 
now as to any amounts that were referred to in relation 
to medical expenses as that related to the accident of July 
1969'! TR 157. 
21 
Ans.: I have never seen an itemization of expenses 
so I don't have exact amounts. At that time Attorney 
Eliason told me that there were expenses relating to thi8 
injury of approximately $1200. I never seen a list or 
itemization of these, no. 
When counsel for defendant was cross-examining 
Mary Pauley relative to the negotiations of herself and 
her Attorney with John M. Ware, whom she didn't even 
recall, counsel asked her: "And do you deny telling him 
that you had incurred medical specials in the sum of 
$1200.00 solely from the accident that you were involved 
in in July of 1969? Do you deny telling him that? TR 51. 
Ans.: I don't remember the conversation. 
Question: Do you remember telling him you thought 
the injuries you had sustained in the accident of July, 
1969, were worth $7500.00? Do you remember telling him 
that? 
Ans.: I asked to settle for that, yes. 
Question: And prior to that time you had told him 
and indicated that the injuries you had sustained were 
worth $10,000.00. Isn't that true? TR 51-52. 
Ans.: No, because I didn't see him only one day. 
Question: Did you ever give your Attorney authority 
to settle that for $10,000.00 prior to that time? I am 
talking about just the accident of July, 1969. 
Ans.: I don't know what my Attorney might have 
said to him when I was not there. 
Question: I am asking you whether or not you in-
structed or gave your Attorney authority to submit 
that figure to Mr. Ware. 
It is submitted to the Court that the only purpose 
whatsoever for the questions and answer;.; of John M. 
Ware, Insurance Adju~ter for Nationwide Insurance Com-
pany, and the further que"'tions which co um el thrust upon 
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the witness relative to negotiations for settlement with 
Nationwide of injurie.:; in a sub.:;equent accident, was to 
embarrass the Plaintiff with the Jury and make it appear 
that she was requesting exce~sive amounts for the injur-
ies she had wstained and even made it appear to the Jury 
that it wa3 improper to negotiate such settlement on a 
figure more than what may have been actual special dam-
ages. She was made to appear money hungry and claim 
c0n:;cious. Insurance ~-ettlement question would have been 
prejudicial if asked by Plaintiff. The Doctor alone could 
te,,tify as to which injuries were attributable to which 
accident. 
It is submitted that the testimony was wholly imma-
terial, irrelevent and prejudicial. That it prejudiced the 
Jury to the point that she could not thereafter have a fair 
determinat:on of her injuries in the December 5, 1967 ac-
cident, and when the Court overruled Plaintiff's counsel's 
objections to the line of questioning and to any further 
quectioning which was overruled on the grounds that the 
defendant was testing the credibility of the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was never thereafter able to overcome the ef-
fects of such prejudicial treatment. 
POINT IV.: The Court should prevent manife-:-t in-
justice as is macle evident from the judgment being 
against the weight of the evidence, and rehear issue of 
damages. 
It is within the power of the triai and appellate 
Court and their bounden duty to prevent injustice if it can 
be determined to exist, as when the verdict is against the 
greater weight of the competent evidence presented and 
in order to prevent such an injustice, courts sometimes 
0irert that partfrular issues be retried or in the alterna-
tive that cert:=iin awards be modified to prevent such in-
inst;ce. It goes without rnying that had the jury in the 
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instant ca::ie made an award of $100,000.00 to the Plain-
tiff based upon the evidence which was submitted the 
trial court and the appellate court should be compelled 
to recognize the excessivene,;,s of the damage found by the 
jury and unless such injustice was otherwise corrected it 
would be incumbent to order either a new trial upon the 
issue of damages only or as has been stated by this Court: 
in Langton vs. International Transport Inc. 26 Utah 2nd 
452, 491 Pac. 2d 1211 
It is equally well recognized that the trial court or 
the appellate court may, because of the inadequacy of the 
award, require a review or new trial of the issue in ques~ 
ti on (damage) or a new trial on all the issues. 58 Am 
Jur 2d pg. 211, Sec. 27. In a proper case the Court may 
order a retrial on the issue of proximate cause. Burke v. 
Hodge 97 NE 920 34 ALR 2d 988. 
"No distinction is to be drawn between the granting 
of a new trial because of excessive damages and the 
ordering of a retrial by reason of the fact that dam-
ages awarded by the verdict were inadequate. 58 Am 
Jur., 2d. 360 Sec. 153. 
"As has been said, a verdict for a grossly inadequate 
amount stands upon no higher ground in legal prin-
ciples or in rules of law than a verdict for an exces-
sive or extravagal}.t amount, and no reason can be 
given why a new trial may not be granted upon one 
ground as well as upon the other, although it 'is doubt-
less true that the granting of a new trial upon the 
grounds of inadequacy of damages occurs less fre-
quently than the granting of new trials upon the 
grounds of excessive damages, because it is not as 
easy to detect inadequacy as it is to detect excessive-
ness " 
It i!'; submitted thqt after the Tr;al Court found neg-li-
gence as a mattPr of law. without any evidence whatso-
ever of contributor:v negli<rence, intervention of Third 
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Party and uncontradicted, conclusive, believeable, corrob-
orated evidence that Plaintiff incurred doctor bills the 
same day for treatment for neck injury by Dr. Clifford 
N. Cutler, in the amount of $97.00 TR 15; bill from 
physical therapists who treated the patient beginning 
with treatments the day following the accident; uncon-
tradicted and stipulated evidence that the plaintiff sus-
tained los ~ of earnings because of inability to attend work 
for 11 % days, in the ioUm of $180.00; and the fact that the 
pla.ntiff su.>taincd hospital and doctor bills at Cotton-
wood Ho:pital, Latter Day Saints Ho,:,pital and with Dr. 
LaVerne Erickson, Neuro surgeon, the amount of which 
services ·were filed as Exh:bit "P l" and stipulated to by 
counsel. That the jury were required to find some dam-
ages based upon the conclm,iveness of the evidence; and 
that to find no rl.amage is tantamount to finding an in-
adequacy of damages in view of the finding of negligence, 
and that is;ue should be retried. 
i ne matter of the Plaintiff's right to a new trial is 
discu:.sed in the next and final point of Plaintiff's brief, 
but the serioU3 injustice wrought on the Plaintiff by the 
failure of the Court and Jury to communicate properly is 
g-rounds for the Appellant Court to correct the injustice 
by retrial of the issue involved. 
Where there has been an inadequate award of dam-
age3 which appears to have been given under the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice or under license of misadven-
ture or mistake, under the rule a new trial must be grant-
ed to correct the error. Rule 59 A-5 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Langton v. International Transport Inc. supra. 
YV u\/ 1 v : The Court erred and abused its discre-
tion in denial of Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
There is nothing more definite in the law nor more 
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clearly pronounced in the Utah statutes than the rights of 
a party, where injustice has resulted, to relief by a new 
trial. It is an abuse of discretion to deny it where the 
constitutional rights of a litigant have been denied in one 
or more of the following circumstances : 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the Court, Jury 
or adverse party or any order of the Court or abuse 
of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
2. Error in law or failure of the Jury to apply the 
law to the fact situation against the law. 
3. Excessive or inadequate damages mistakenly 
granted or under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
Rule 59-A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As was observed by Lord Mansfield in Bright vs. Ey-
rion, 1 Burrows 390. 
"The effect of a new trial is no more than having 
a cause more deliberately considered by another jury 
when there is reasonable doubt or perhaps certainty 
that justice has not been done." 
In a recent Utah case in an action by patient against 
the hospial in which the jury found no cause of action and 
judge entered judgement for the patient against the hospi-
tal on question of negligence and ordered a new trial lim-
judgement entered accordingly, and thereafter the trial 
ited to damages. The writer of the prevailing opinion 
stated in Highland v. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 
427 P2, 736: 
"Not withstanding- the fact that it w::i s not en-
tirely without reason for the trial Court to cletermine 
that evidence E;howed so persuasively that the Order-
ly was responsible for what happened that a finding 
exculp<iting- the Hospital of nevli.2"ence workerl a ~eri­
ous injustice anrl the o-ranting of a new trial E"houlrl 
be 011 all of the issue"." 
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In that case, the Plaintiff was requesting a 
new trial on the issue of damage.:; only and the Court's 
ruling speaks loudly in favor of the Plaintiff's position 
in the instant ca;:,e. In the Highland case the Plaintiff 
sued for injuries suffered while being catharized by an 
orderly in the Defendant St. Mark's Hospital. Without 
detailing the fact situation, the Plaintiff in that ca;:,e was 
reccvering from a heart attack. In that case there was 
some evidence that the orderly, Manzanare's procedures 
in performing th€ function produced. the injury of which 
the plaintiff complained ancl there was '-'ome further evi-
dence that there may have been ir.terference by the Plain-
tiff which affected the outccme of the catharization, but 
even so, the Court made this important :ctatement in 
its ruling: 
"Notwithstanding the fact that the trial Court's 
ruling does not impres; us as wholly unreasonable, out 
of a desire that a new trial be fair to both sides, we 
believe that justice would best be E:erved by removing 
any restriction upon, and accordingly through a new 
trial on all of the issues." 
The ;::;upreme Court has further said in that case, 
"We have indeed frequently affirmed the importance 
of trial by jury, however, it must be realized that 
even a jury is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond the 
possibility of error. Like other aspects of authority 
in our system of government under law, it is e'sential 
that there be some check against arbitrarines3, abu'e 
or mistake. The safeguard against this is the author-
ity of the trial judge who has supervisory control 
over the proceedings and is charged with the ult;-
mate responsibility of seeing that justice is done. To 
accomplish that purpo"e it is essential that his power 
to grant or deny motions for new trial be recognized. 
This is necpssarily rnmethinir more than simply to 
rule as a matter of law that the ~vidence will or will 
not supoort ~ verdict. The fatter woul<l only allow 
him to judge whether tl1e verdict should be rnstained 
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as a matter of law, and would not permit any lati-
tude of discretion." 
"Consistent with the purpose just discussed, 
whenever what has transpired in the proceeding is so 
offensive to the trial court's sense of justice that he 
_believes the desired objective of affording the parties 
a fair trial has failed, he has both the prerogative 
and the duty to grant a new trial. " 
If the trial Court abuses its discretion then thanks to 
our system the review court can correct the abuse. 
Plaintiff cites in support of his request for a new 
trial, the Court ruling in Holmes v. Nelson, Ut. 326, Pac. 
2d 722. In that case an action for injuries sustained by 
a three and one-half year old child who ran into the street 
and was struck by defendant's automobile at about 8 :20 
P.M. in mid-July, was heard by the jury, who returned a 
verdict of NO cause of action. In that ca<:e it will be not-
ed there was a question of the extent of negligence of de-
fendant, possibility of contributory negligence and una-
voidable accident, none of which exist in the present case. 
In view of the conflicting testimony in that case, not-
withstanding the fact that there was believeable evidence 
to sustain the jury's findings of no cause of action, and 
even the further question of unavoidable accident the 
Court granted a new trial because the Court said there 
was ample evidence to support a verdict for the child and 
therefore it was proper to grant the child a new trial on 
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to justify aver-
dict of No cause of action. 
If the evidence was insufficient to justify no cause of 
action in that c2se, then the error in the present ca'.-'e in 
failing to grant a new trial becomes more apparent b~,­
cause in the insbrnt case there wa..; the finding of negli-
gence, the ab-enc~ of contrihutor,1.T ne:.digence, the ab. ence 
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of unavoidability, the absence of contradiction as to clam-
ages. 
The law with regard to granting a new trial 
\\'here verdict has been rendered on insufficient evi-
dence is well stated in 58 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 140, pg. 347, 
111 the following language: 
"Sec. 140: If a verdict agamst a party has been ren-
dered on insufficient evidence, his remedy is by way 
of an application for a new trial. Indeed, a motion 
for a new trial is indispensable where a case has been 
tried to a jury and the unsuccessful party desires to 
test the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. 
Where the evidence offered for the party for 
whom a verdict has been rendered, conceding to it·. 
the greatest probative force to which according to 
the laws of evidence, it is fairly entitled, is insuffic-
ient to support or to justify the verdict, it is 
the duty of the Court to set it aside and grant a new 
trial. A new trial will be granted where the verdict 
is wholly unsupported_by the evidence in an essential 
particular, or where both -parties have, without fault, 
failed to introduce material evidence." 
This Court has said in ruling upon""'i>imilar matters 
that when it comes to applying the law t;---)lundisputed 
facts, the Appellate Judges are not to be classed as unreas-
onable simply because they don't agree with the Trial 
.Judge. 
A very similar case was heard by the Supreme tourt 
in the case of EFCO Distributing Inc. vs Ferrin, 17 Utah 
2 375, 412, p 2, 615, although in that case plaintiff failed 
to produce evidence of damage and the claim of any lorn 
was unsupported It is a strong holding for the case here. 
The case was an action for damage for breach 
• 
7'. of contract by defendant in failing to order out fro d t..{ c:.. T -S 
fifCuurt said. 
"If it clearly appears that there has been mIScarriage 
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of justice bec:a use jury ha . .; refused to accept Ci' edible 
uncontradicted evidence, where there i;:; no rational 
basis for rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that jurv 
has acted under misconception of proven facts, or ha·s 
misapplied or disregarded law, or where it appears 
that verdict was re.,,ult of passion or prejudice, it i.s 
both the prerogative and duty of Court to set aside 
verdict and grant a new trial. This doe;; not have the 
effect of depriving a party of a fair trial by jury, but 
in reality is a safeguard to assure it." 
CONCLUSION 
In the extens1ve research made it is difficult to find 
a parallel to the instant case. where the Court has found 
negli~ence as a matter of law, and where contributory 
negligence and/or an intervening cause have been ruled 
out. And especially where all the evidence supported the 
plaintiff's claim of injury caused by the defendant and 
no evidence was presented by the defendant denying the 
liability or denying the loss of wages, the expenses in-
curred for doctor and hospital charges following the in-
jury and accident. 
The only testimony produced by defendant was her 
. . d ,.. J V: I "1 L, Pl . own ,where she admitted to neghgence/ mtoj arn-
tiff's · vehicle and claimed no excuse. And the testi-
mony of a medical Doctor called by the insurance 
company to make an evaluation about two years 
after the accident, whose testimony at best could only 
tend to minimize the damages caused by the injuries in 
the accident of December 5, 1967. He didn't claim that 
the plaintiff's dcrtors and physical therapists had not per-
formed their S8rvices as testified to, nor th::tt such service' 
were not p.!·nper under their diagnosis. He, in fact cor-
roborated the histcn' of p8.in n~d suffering since the ac-
cident. 
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The only othe1· delendant witness was the inimrance 
adjuster uc,rn l''<ationwiue ln.,;urance Co., who gave testi-
mony that rn a .,,ubsequent act:ident of July 19tftf he hau 
attempted to uegotiate a settlement with pldintiff and 
her attorney for a sum whicn was quoted by the attorney 
for negotiation but for which sett1ement was deferred. The 
only rational meaning the Court could give to such testi-
mony was an acknowledgement of damages and liability 
which the second ccmpany should help pay. 
The in.o tructions of the Court were faulty after he 
found negligence as a matter of law that he didn't find 
the negligence proximately cam.ed or contributed to the 
injuries and that he didn't find liability as a matter of 
law rather than to leave the jury with insufficient instruc-
tions, or guidelines. 
When the trial judge subsequently found the jury as 
a result of error or prejudice had mis-applied the law to 
the fact'3 and had made a verdict contrary to all the cre-
dible evidence and contrary to both the law and the facts, 
then that 11; was abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to not have corrected the matter by granting a new trial 
i:i.e1; h li!8rl'sskei tho tt ts granting I trjA.l.. 
either on the issue of damage or a new trial on all the 
issues, and it is respectfully submitted that to correct 
the injustice thus caused that the Appellate Court should 
remand the matter for rehearing of the issues involved 
or direct a judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELDON A. ELIASON 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant 
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